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REGULATION OF INDECENCY IN POLITICAL
BROADCASTING

The First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of
the press have long been in tension with the public's right to be
free from invasions of privacy. Nowhere has the tens'ion been
sharper in recent years than in the area of governmental intervention into the affairs of the broadcast media. Indecency in political
broadcasting is one situation in particular in which these values
are likely to come into conflict. This article examines this situation; specifically, it considers whether the government can proscribe "indecent" political commercials and broadcasts.
Two recent legal disputes highlight the problem. In FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 1 the Supreme Court upheld Federal Communications Commission (FCC) sanctions against a radio station
for an "indecent" broadcast of words which the Commission
found to be sexually offensive. In so holding, the Court reaffirmed
the government's authority to regulate the broadcast media.
The problem of regulation of indecency in political broadcasting arose again during the 1978 gubernatorial primary in Georgia.
J.B. Stoner, a candidate for the Democratic nomination, sponsored a series of television commercials which included the assertion that "[i]f Busbee [Stoner's opponent] is re-elected, he will
pass more civil rights that take from the whites and give to the
niggers." Responding to a complaint filed by Julian Bond, a wellknown black politician, the FCC determined that it could not
restrict such broadcasts. 2.Bond compared Stoner's use of the word
"nigger" to the indecency which was broadcast in Pacifica. The
FCC rejected his claim, noting that the Supreme Court limited
the application of the statutory prohibition in Pacifica to sexual
or excretory "indecency. " 3
This article focuses on two situations in which the First
1 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The Supreme Court upheld the imposition of a $100 fine against
a New York radio station, WBAI, for a midaftemoon broadcast of a comedy routine
written and performed by George Carlin which featured a number of "profane" words. The
routine, entitled "Filthy Words," concerned society's attitude toward certain words, particularly those highlighted in the monologue. (For a transcript of the monologue, see 438
U.S. at 751-55). After receiving a complaint from one listener, the FCC determined that
the broadcast violated the ban on indecent language imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976).
1
Julian Bond, 69 F.C.C. 2d 943 (1978).
1
Id. at 944.
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Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press
may conflict with the countervailing right of the public to be free
from exposure to certain types of speech: first, the government's
ability to extend its prohibition against indecency to offensive
speech not currently prohibited, such as that used by Stoner;
second, the use of "indecent" language, as defined in Pacifica, by
a political candidate.
The article considers both the constitutional and statutory aspects of the regulation of indecency in political broadcasting. The
discussion is limited to considering "indecency," a term excluding obscenity or incitement to violence, because the government's
power to regulate these types of speech is well established. 4 Indecent speech would be protected if used in the print media, since
it does not fall within the established First Amendment exceptions. 5 The basic constitutional question, therefore, is whether the
broadcast media are inherently different from the print media, so
as to justify different treatment of indecent political speech. This
article will contend that they are not inherently different.
In the constitutional analysis, both sexual and non-sexual
forms of indecency will be considered. The Supreme Court has,
thus far, defined the prohibited statutory indecency to include
only excretory and sexual language.8 This standard is not constitutionally mandated. The contention underlying Bond's complaint is that non-sexual offensiveness should also be subject to
regulation by the government. Whatever legitimate state interests are furthered by the prohibition of sexual indecency may also
be served by the broader regulation of other offensive speech. 7
The article contends that, in determining what forms of speech
may be regulated as "indecent," it is improper summarily to
exclude non-sexual speech as the FCC has done.
The second aspect of the problem concerns statutory interpretation. If it is constitutionally permissible to regulate indecent
political speech, do the applicable statutes authorize such
interference? Certain federal statutes prohibit the broadcast of
indecent speech, while others prohibit censorship by the FCC and
broadcasting stations. In resolving this conflict, this article concludes that indecent political speech is generally not within the
reach of the statutes banning indecency.
' See notes 22-41 and accompanying text infra.
• See Part IAl infra.
• Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739.
1 See notes 147-49 and accompanying text infra.
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The governmental interest asserted in regulation is the need to
protect the public from unwanted, indecent speech. This claim
requires an examination of the scope of indecency and the justifications for its suppression.
1. Relation to unprotected speech-Some speech is so offensive to society that it is absolutely unprotected. 8 This category of
speech-obscenity-is limited strictly to "works which, taken as
a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex [as determined by
the application of contemporary community standards], which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which,
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value." 9 Since obscenity does not have constitutional
protection, it is subject to full regulation within the context of the
broadcast media, 10 as well as within the contexts of other media.
The only indecency standard adopted by the Supreme Court
proscribes offensive references to "excretory or sexual activities or
organs." 11 This standard, based on offensiveness and application
to sexual references, indicates that indecency, at least as it is
understood by the FCC in the cases it prosecutes, is strongly
related to obscenity. Since the FCC includes only sexual indecency within the statutory. prohibition, the Court has never had
to deal with justifications for regulating other sorts of offensive
speech. Therefore, one approach to determine the reach of
"indecency" is to examine the reasons for the prohibition of obscenity.t2
Not only sexually-offensive speech, but also non-sexual speech,
such as racial and religious epithets, may be offensive. For example, many people find the word "nigger" deeply offensive. In
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 13 the Supreme Court upheld prohibition
• Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1972); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
• Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
•• For a discussion of this "two-level" theory, see notes 61-64 and accompanying text
infra.
11 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739. See notes 155-63 and accompanying text infra. Indecency,
at least in the broadcast sense, is a superset of obscenity.
12 See Part IA2 infra.
11
343 U.S. 250 (1952). Beauharnois involved speech which, if directed at an individual,
could be deemed libelous and thus unprotected. The leaflets distributed by the defendant
called on the Chicago government to "halt the further encroachment, harassment, and
invasion of white people . . . by the Negro" and claimed that "[i]f persuasion and the
need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite us,
then the aggressions . . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns, and marijuana of the negro, surely
will." 343 U.S. at 252.
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of such an epithet as a form of group libel. While Beauharnais is
of dubious precedential value, 14 it raises the issue of whether racist speech, while offensive to many, can properly be regulated.
The threat posed by most racist speech is twofold: offensiveness
to the general audience and disparagement of the target racial or
religious group. Furthermore, such speech subverts fundamental
American principles of equality. Beauharnais, however, was
based on group libel, not the offensiveness of the speech, and is
therefore distinguishable from indecency cases where the speech
is proscribed precisely because it is offensive. In group libel cases,
the evil to be avoided is breach of the peace. 15 The mere offensiveness of such epithets is not a justification for regulation, however,
since it is the idea and not the speech which gives offense. 18
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that where the
speech itself causes harm, it may be regulated. Words "which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace" are unprotected by the First Amendment. 17
While this "fighting words" doctrine may seem able to subsume
racially offensive speech, there are two problems with including
such speech within its scope. First, in order for spoken words to
be considered "fighting words," they must be void of any valid
communicative function. 18 But the use of racially offensive terms
should be viewed as a communication of ideas. It is the racist
thought which give such words their offensive nature, and if it is
the idea that gives offense, then the speech is protected. 19 Second,
in order for spoken words to constitute "fighting words" they
must tend to provoke an immediate breach of the peace. It is
questionable whether racial epithets have that tendency, especially in the broadcast situation. The FCC has determined that
under the circumstances of Stoner's 1972 Senate campaign they
did not. 20
" See Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 697-98 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978), in which the court upheld the right of American
Nazis to march in a predominantly Jewish suburb of Chicago. In voting to grant certiorari
in Collin, Justices Blackmun and White noted the need to resolve the possible conflict
with Beauharnois as to the prohibition of racially-offensive speech. 439 U.S. at 919.
The Court has noted that racial overtones do not strip speech of its First Amendment
protection. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 134 (1966).
" Beauharnois, 343 U.S. at 254.
" See notes 72-75 and accompanying text infra.
17
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
'" Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
" Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564,567 (1970); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
20
Atlanta NAACP, 36 F.C.C.2d 635 (1972); Note, Morality and the Broadcast Media:
A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory Standards, 84 HARV. L. REV. 664,673 (1971)
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An examination of the justifications for the prohibition of unprotected speech demonstrates that the reasons for the prohibition of indecency are closely related to those for the prohibition
of obscenity. As the Court itself noted in Pacifica, "(indecent]
words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends. " 21 The
justifications for the prohibition of "fighting words," it has been
shown, do not lend themselves to the regulation of indecency.
2. Rationales for the prohibition of obscenity and indecency-In Miller v. California, 22 a leading obscenity case, the
Court concentrated on establishing a test for obscenity; minimal
reference was made to the reasons for its prohibition. The only
such explanation given by the Court was that "the States have a
legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of
obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it
a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles."23 That statement, however,
is of little help in determining why obscenity alone is regulated.
It fails to state a legitimate state interest different from that
which would mandate regulation of any offensive speech.
Professor Kalven has suggested four justifications for the regulation of obscenity: "(1) the incitement to antisocial sexual conduct; (2) psychological excitement resulting from sexual imagery;
(3) the arousing of feelings of disgust and revulsion; and (4) the
advocacy of improper sexual values." 2• He summarily dismissed
the second justification as unfit for governmental concern: the
state has no reason to care about adult sexual fantasies. 25 The
first justification, incitement of antisocial conduct, "evaporates
in light of the absence of any evidence to show a connection
between the written word and overt sexual behavior." 26 Kalven's
("For the most part, a prohibition that turns on the risk of provoking violence is obviously
inapplicable to broadcasting.").
See generally Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1972); Collin v. Smith,
447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), af{'d, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978); Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667
(N.D. Ill. 1976); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 69 Ill. 2d 605,
373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
21
438 U.S. at 746.
12
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
23
Id. at 18-19. The Court also noted that the linguistic analysis of the word "obscene"
focuses exclusively on its offensiveness or repugnancy to established values, but does not
refer to sex. The legal definition of "obscene" is closer to that of pornography, and thus
focuses on material dealing with sex. Id. at 18 n.2. Thus, offensiveness is an underlying
justification for the regulation of obscenity.
" Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 3-4.
zs Id. at 4. But see J. PAUL & M. SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP: OBSCENITY IN THE MAIL
199-200 (1961).
" Kalven, supra note 24, at 4.
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doubt has not been resolved since this formulation. A major government study found little if any effect of erotic material on sexual behavior. 27
The fourth justification, advocacy of improper sexual values, is
easily dismissed as an improper target of regulation. In Kalven's
words, "[i]t is hard to see why the advocacy of improper sexual
values should fare differently, as a constitutional matter, from
any other exposition in the realm of ideas." 28 All societal values
are subject to criticism, including sexual values. The Supreme
Court has permitted such advocacy; 29 it is only when the material
itself violates the norm that it is subject to regulation. 30 Although
Kalven also dismisses the arousal of disgust and revulsion as "an
impossibly trivial base for making speech a crime," 31 this justification seems to be the one subsequently adopted by the Court. 32
One justification not suggested by Kalven is the maintenance
of society's moral standards. Arguably, the state has a legitimate
interest in preventing moral decay. The Supreme Court, in upholding a ban on obscene films, indicated that the government
can legislate to maintain "the quality of life and the total community environment . . . . " 33 This view has been supported by
a number of commentators, 34 and extends to the protection of an
individual from self-harm and society from the effects of wide27 "In general, established patterns of sexual behavior were found to be very stable and
not altered substantially by exposure to erotica. When sexual activity occurred following
the viewing or reading of these materials, it constituted a temporary activation of individuals' preexisting patterns of sexual behavior." THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 25 (1970) [hereinafter cited as OBSCENITY REPORT].
The Commission also could "not conclude that exposure to erotic materials is a factor
in the causation of sex crimes or sex delinquency." Id. at 27. The Commission noted that
in Denmark, "the increased availability of explicit sexual materials has been accompanied
by a decrease in the incidence of sexual crime." Id.
•• Kalven, supra note 24, at 4; accord, H. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY 208
(1969); W. LoCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 989 (1975).
'" In Kingsley Int'! Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89, the Court stated:
It is contended that the State's action was justified because the motion picture
attractively portrays a relationship which is contrary to the moral standards, the
religious precepts, and the legal code of its citizenry. This argument misconceives
what it is that the Constitution protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the
expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority, It protects
advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than
advocacy of socialism or the single tax.
30
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746 n.22; Robert Bork, Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, University
of Michigan Law School (Panel Discussion, February 7, 1979).
31
Kalven, supra note 24, at 4.
•• See note 23 supra; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. See also H. CLOR, supra note 28, at
198; w. LoCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 28, at 989.
13
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
" See, e.g., H. CLoR, supra note 28, at 175-206; Henkin, Morals and the Constitution:
The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1963).
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spread moral decay. The thesis underlying this position is that
society shares certain values which serve a cohesive function. The
origins of these values are irrelevant; it is their general acceptance
that gives them their current validity. 35
The need to protect against moral decay, a justification for
regulation, can be refuted by the inherent right of society to
change its standards. Society's moral values have changed, 38 particularly in the past two decades. Advocacy is permitted, in part,
so that society can alter its values. If there is a right to make this
choice, there must be a right to exercise it. The underlying assumption is that after considering the alternatives, society will
indicate its choice by the general behavior of its members. One
response to this argument is that it is the responsibility of the
legislatures to gauge society's standards, and that some people
may favor imposition of stricter standards than they would follow
if left to decide for themselves. Another argument against regulation of indecency under this justification is that the best remedy
for moral decay may not be to ban it but to counter it with
speech. 37
The effect which indecency has on children provides another
rationale for its regulation. In considering obscenity cases, the
Court has upheld a stricter standard of obscenity for material
available to children. 38 Regulation of otherwise protected speech
thu~ depends on the audience as well as content; its availability
to children may bring offensive speech within the scope of permissible regulation. 39 Protection of children is not an absolute justification for regulation, however, since there is little evidence to
support the contention that exposure to pornography is harmful
to juveniles. ' 0
The justifications for regulating obscenity which seem both to
have been adopted and to be reasonable are its offensiveness to
the public, the prevention of moral decay, and the protection of
children. All of these can also be bases for regulation of indecency, 41 which is offensive to many and violative of established
so The separation of church and state does not prevent the imposition of Biblical or
other religious standards which have been adopted by society as a whole and are ·not
limited to any particular group. Henkin, supra note 34, at 407-11.
11
H. CLOR, supra note 28, at 192 .
., But see id., ·ch. 5.
.. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See also text accompanying note 23 supra.
st
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50.
,. J. PAUL & M. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 194-95; R.EPoRT OF THE EFFECTS PANEL,
OBSCENITY REPORT, supra note 27, at 139-255; Larrabee, The Cultural Context of Sex
Censorship, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 672, 681 (1955); Note, supra note 20, at 681.
" See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50; Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S.
728 (1970); Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to be Spoken To?, 67 NW.
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societal norms.
3. The relationship between indecency and offensiveness-Speech related to sex has historically been regulated.
There are many types of speech or broadcasts, however, which are
offensive but not generally subject to regulation. The Court has
devised no justification for this peculiar treatment of sexual matters, yet is continues to uphold the same regulation by community standards which would be unconstitutional if applied to
other forms of speech, such as violence, sacrilege, vulgarity, and
prejudice. 42
The approach established by the Court in Pacifica for the regulation of offensive speech appears to involve two steps. First, the
Court determines whether the speech is indecent. Second, if the
speech is deemed indecent, the Court determines if it is the message and not just the method of expression which gives offense.
If it is only the former, the speech has value to society and is
protected despite its indecent nature. 43
Under the first part of this test, it is possible to determine that
non-sexual material is indecent. The sexual and excretory limitation in Pacifica is the result of the FCC's interpretation of the
statute, not a constitutional standard. 44 Indecency, according to
the Court, is a general term which "merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality." 45 Nothing in this definition specifically includes sex and eliminates other subjects.
The justification for the regulation of indecency is the public's
desire to be free from offensive communications. People find certain words or subjects upsetting and do not want to be confronted
by them. Whatever the nature of a person's sensibilities, they
represent individual values and choices and so deserve some deference. It is impossible, however, to defer to every individual's
judgment without stripping our conversations and broadcasts of
all their color and emotive force. 48 Therefore, protection must be
limited to regulation of "patently offensive" speech-speech
which many or most people find extremely offensive. This standard would probably be most applicable to sexual or excretory
references, since they are traditionally regarded as most likely to
U.L. REV. 153 (1972).
" Note, Offensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE L.J. 1343, 1363 (1970).
" Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746-47.
" The Court in Pacifica was only choosing between the FCC standard of patently
offensive sexual or excretory references and Pacifica's argument for an obscenity standard.
Therefore, it did not consider whether the prohibition could be broader than that urged
by the FCC. Id. at 738-39.
"Id. at 740.
" See notes 76-79 and accompanying text infra.
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give offense. 47
In the second part of the test for offensive speech which is
subject to regulation, sexual references are less likely to be considered as carrying messages than other forms of potentially offensive speech. Offensive displays of violence, for instance, may
raise questions and convey messages about our society. Sexual
references, on the other hand, may or may not carry any messages.
There is no universal definition of "indecent speech." At a
minimum, it is offensive speech relating to sexual or excretory
matters which is not within the obscenity standard. It is possible
to include non-sexual offensive speech, but only if it is generally
valueless. The more offensive the speech, the more likely it will
be found "indecent"; the greater its social value, the less likely
it will be found "indecent." The context in which it is presented,
such as the time of day or program, also bears on its
"indecency." 48 The limitation is that it must be the speech itself,
not the ideas conveyed by the speech, that gives offense.

B.

Protection of Political Speech

Opposing the interest in protecting citizens from unwanted offensive speech is the commitment to free speech enunciated in
the First Amendment. It is necessary to examine both the reasons
for protecting speech and the scope of speech to be protected.
1. Types of First Amendment analysis-One theory of free
speech is "absolutist": the language of the First Amendment prohibits all governmental interference with speech. 49 This position
has been rejected by the Supreme Court in a large number of
cases both upholding50 and rejecting51 restraints on speech. Close
" The Court in Pacifica noted this general tendency:
The Commission stated [in its Pacifica ruling]: "Obnoxious, gutter language
describing these [sexual and excretory] matters has the effect of debasing and
brutalizing human beings by reducing them to their mere bodily functions . . . . "
56 F.C.C. 2d, at 98. Our society has a tradition of performing certain bodily
functions in private, and severely limiting the public exposure of discussion of
such matters. Verbal or physical acts exposing those intimacies are offensive
irrespective of any message that may accompany the exposure.
438 U.S. at 746 n.23. See also Kalven, supra note 24, at 18.
41
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
" The major proponent of this position was Justice Black. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56-81 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 140-44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 43-63
(1968) .
.. See, e.g., Time, -Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
•• See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); New York Times Co.
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to the "absolutist" position is the "maximum protection" theory
proposed by Professors Dorsen and Gora, under which only certain "rigorously defined" categories of speech are subject to regulation, and. then only under narrow circumstances. 52
Another theory, espoused by Professor Robert Bork, is that the
only speech afforded First Amendment protection should be
speech related to self-government. 53 Since the Constitution itself
provides no clue as to the meaning of the First Amendment, the
Court must look to the document as a whole. Since, in Bork's
view, the purpose of the Constitution is to insure self-government,
only speech relating to that function is protected by the First
Amendment. 5' This narrow construction of the Constitution has
been rejected by the Supreme Court. In contrast, the Court has
held that the First Amendment protects non-political as well as
political speech. 55
Regardless of which interpretation of the First Amendment is
adopted, speech relating to the conduct of government is protected. The Court has clearly included the discussion of public
affairs within the scope of the First Amendment. The underlying
concept is that encouragement of the discussion of all viewpoints
leads to the proper resolution of questions. The Court noted in
Red Lion Broadcasting u. FCC, "[i]t is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, " 58 and in another leading
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
02 Address by Norman Dorsen, "The Burger Court and Free Expression: Property
Rights or Maximum Protection," Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, University of Michigan
Law School (February 6, 1979). These narrow circumstances include only military secrets,
trade secrets, commercial misrepresentation, and assaultive. or shocking speech
"equivalent to a slap in the face."
., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2425 (1971). In discussing Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 257, 275 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, J.J., concurring), Professor Bork notes four
benefits of free speech protection. These are:
"1. The development of the faculties of the individual;
2. · The happiness to be derived from engaging in the activity;
3. The provision of a safety valve for society; and,
4. The discovery and spread of political truth." Bork, supra.
•• Bork, supra note 53. This is largely based on the writings of Professor Meiklejohn,
who views political speech as the primary application of the First Amendment. See Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, in A. MEIKLE.JOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM 3 (1960). Professor Kalven claims that the Supreme Court began to accept this
view in its 1964 decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Kalven,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,"
1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221.
•• United Mines Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (union employment of attorney for litigation of members); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)
(invasion of privacy) .
.. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). This "marketplace of ideas" theory was first enunciated in
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case, the Court mentioned the "profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 57 Thus, political speech merits
special protection. For the purposes of this article, "political
speech" refers to any words used by a candidate for elective office
in seeking that office. Paid political commercials, such as those
sponsored by Busbee, 58 are especially relevant to this discussion
because they are totally within the candidate's control and are
thus most likely to be reflective of the candidate's true beliefs and
traits.
2. Applicable test-After establishing that the First Amendment protects discussion of public issues, it is necessary to determine which standard of review to apply to a particular regulation.
The "clear and present danger" test, first enunciated in Schenck
v. United States, 59 is no longer dispositive. Although it has not
been expressly overturned by the Court, Professor Kalven notes
that it has fallen from use. 80
Another approach suggested for First Amendment questions is
the "two-level" theory. Under this theory, speech is categorized
Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
57 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Prof. Kalven considers
the Sullivan case to be the crucial opinion in First Amendment analysis because it identifies the discussion of public issues as the activity central to free speech.
The Amendment has a "central meaning"-a core of protected speech without
which democracy cannot function, without which, in Madison's phrase, "the
censorial power" would ·be in the Government over the people and not "in the
people over the Government." This is not the whole meaning of the Amendment.
There are other freedoms protected by it. But at the center there is no doubt what
speech is being protected and no doubt about why it is protected. The theory of
the freedom of speech clause was put right side up for the first time.
Kalven, supra note 54, at 208. This conclusion is based on the Court's absolute rejection
of seditious libel laws. He further states that "[t)he touchstone of the First Amendment
has become the abolition of seditious libel and what that implies about the function of
free speech on public issues in American democracy." Id. at 209.
08
See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
•• 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Under this test created by Justice Holmes, "[t)he question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances so as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent." Id. at 52. In obscenity cases, the "substantive evils" being prevented are those discussed in notes 22-41 and accompanying text supra .
.. "[l)t is clear that, as of the judgment in the Times case, it has disappeared." Kalven,
supra note 54, at 213-14. See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Douglas and
Black, JJ., concurring); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 912 (1963).
Kalven also asserts that the Court in Sullivan rejected the concept of less strict scrutiny
of state enactments than of acts of the federal government, which is another approach for
First Amendment scrutiny of regulation. This standard, however, is inapplicable to the
discussion of broadcast regulation, which is a federal issue. See Kalven, supra note 54, at
218-19.

80

· Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 13:1

as either protected or unprotected. Protected speech is free from
almost all governmental interference whereas unprotected speech
can be prohibited. The first category of speech is "that which is
worthy enough to require the application of First Amendment
protection" and the second category is beneath First Amendment
concerns." 81 Due to its rigidity, this strict dichotomy is no longer
valid in most areas. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court
held the dichotomy inapplicable to libel, one of the former bastions of the test. 82 "Fighting words," while putatively within this
unprotected area, 83 are excluded only if maintenance of the peace
outweighs freedom of speech in the context in which they are
used. Kalven asserts that "[n]o matter how speech is classified,
there must still be First Amendment consideration and review.
No category of speech is any longer beneath the protection of the
First Amendment. " 84
The final approach is the balancing test. Professor Kalven rejects this approach, but his rejection is limited to the use of balancing for "sanctions . . . imposed for the specific purpose of
restricting speech . . . , " 85 as they are in the case of defamation
(the subject of Sullivan). A balancing approach is permissible,
according to Kalven, in those cases in which "control of speech
is a by-product of government action that is otherwise permissible."88 It is unclear which of these two categories, as described by
Kalven, would encompass regulation of the broadcast media. On
the one hand, broadcast media regulation is "otherwise permissiId. at 217.
"[L]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must
be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment." 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
13
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
" Kalven, supra note 54, at 217-18. The only flaw in this analysis is that obscenity is
still considered unprotected once the speech is found to fall within certain specific boundaries. He claims that "(o]bscenity, too, it would seem, 'can claim no talismanic immunity
from constitutional limitations.'" Id. at 218. The Court has since held: "This much has
been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First
Amendment." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). See also Clor, Public Morality
and Free Expression: The Judicial Search for Principles of Reconciliation, 28 HAST. L.J.
1305, 1310 (1977), where the author states, "[t]hat which meets the stringent legal tests
for obscenity may be censored; that which does not is subject to no restraints whatever
except for wholly content-neutral 'time, place, and manner' . . . regulations."
Even this last bastion of the "two-level" approach yields something close to a balancing
test. Before speech can be condemned as obscene, it must be shown that "taken as a
whole, [it] lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller, 413 U.S.
at 24. This type of speech is unworthy of First Amendment protection. The fact that
patent offensiveness is required under Miller emphasizes the state interest in preventing
offensive speech.
•• Kalven, supra note 54, at 216.
11
Id. This would include zoning regulations and other "time, place, and manner"
restrictions.
11

12
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ble" due to the need to allocate frequencies. On the other hand,
regulation based on the offensive nature of the content is
"imposed for the specific purpose of restricting speech." However, even in Sullivan, as Kalven noted, 67 the Court did not actually refuse to balance the interests of free speech and injury to
reputation. Rather, it held that the "absolute" rule of nonliability for defamation of public figures does not include statements made with "actual malice. " 68 Thus, the balancing approach seems to remain viable in broadcasting, if not for all
media.
Finally, there is the approach which guarantees absolute protection for speech related to governmental functions. This analysis, offered by Kalven, is inadequate because it ignores countervailing interests. No matter how valuable speech of "governing
importance" may be, it seems unreasonable to permit it when it
is intended to and likely to cause an imminent breach of the
peace or other "lawless action. " 69
The Court appears to have established a continuum of protected speech. It has rejected the Bork thesis, but has elevated
speech concerning public issues to the status of most protected.
The safeguards of the First Amendment have been most stringently applied to speech of "governing importance." 70 This policy
is consistent with all the theories of free speech. Whether or not
one believes that self-fulfillment and self-expression are important First Amendment values, these values and the "marketplace
of ideas" principle are served by the stringent protection of
"governing" speech. It serves the need of the speaker to express
his or her views and the need of the audience to hear all ideas.
The weight given to speech in the balancing test depends on the
locus of the speech on the continuum. The more it relates to
government, the more worthy it is of protection.
" Id. at 217.
•• New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
" Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
70
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 410 U.S. 265, 272 (1971); Mills
v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 279 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)
("[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self.
government."); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977).
One author states that "[s]ince the guarantees for speech and press in the first amendment were intended to safeguard and promote effective self-government by the American
people, then if our speech is to be effective to that end, our freedom of speech must
embody the essential freedom to hear what is said . . . . " Comment, Freedom to Hear: A
Political Justification of the First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REv. 311, 328 (1971). See also
Powe, Or of the [Broadcast] Press, 55 TEx. L. REv. 39 (1976).
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The public's need to hear is greatest during electoral campaigns. In voting, the electorate utilizes the knowledge gained
and the opinions formed in the campaign "marketplace." As the
Supreme Court stated, "[i]t can hardly be doubted that the
constitutional guarantee [of free speech] has its fullest and most
urgent application to the conduct of campaigns for political
office." 71
3. Aspect of speech to be regulated-A further question in the
political speech area is how far regulation may intrude into the
message. If political speech can be regulated when it is indecent,
then it is necessary to sever the political content of the speech
from the method of delivery. The difficult problem is what effect
regulating the choice of words has on the content of the message.
Offensiveness of content is not subject to regulation. 72 In
Pacifica, the Supreme Court stated that
if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for affording it constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that
the government must remain neutral in the marketplace
of ideas. If there were any reason to believe that the Commission's characterization of the Carlin monologue as offensive ·could be traced to its political content-or even to
tl;ie fact that it satirizeq contemporary attitudes about
four letter words-First Amendment protection might be
required. 73
This standard supports the FCC's approach in the complaints
against Stoner. 74 The word "nigger" is offensive precisely because
of the political and social meaning attached to it. Under the
Court's interpretation of the First Amendment, the use of this
racial epithet, despite its offensiveness to many, is protected. 75
As the Court's opinion in Pacifica 16 indicated, the use of profanMonitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Police Dep't of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
73 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745-46.
" Bond's complaint was the second such plea for FCC action against Stoner. In his 1972
bid for the Democratic Senatorial nomination, Stoner used commercials claiming that
"[t]he main reason niggers want integration is because they want our white women." The
FCC refused to prohibit these commercials, reasoning that the complaint was based on
potential violence, not indecency. Atlanta NAACP, 36 F.C.C.2d 635 (1972).
" See, e.g., the Skokie/Nazi cases: Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), af{'d,
578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v. National
Socialist Party of America, 51 Ill. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 347 (1977), aff'd in pertinent
part, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
" 438 U.S. at 746 n.22. The Court stated: "The Commission objects, not to [Carlin's]
71

72
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ity can play an essential role in the discussion of public issues.
The intensity of a candidate's feelings plays an integral role in the
message he or she presents. Words which provide emotive impact
deserve protection. It is as unacceptable to control the choice of
words as it is to control the ideas expressed, since controlling
words results in controlling ideas. The Supreme Court adopted
this position in noting that a state is not only prohibited from
preventing a person's expression of anti-draft sentiment, but can
not punish his display of the words "Fuck the Draft" on his jacket
to express this viewpoint. 77 The Court held that choice of words
is an integral part of communication; the emotions attached to
the word "fuck" were indeed part of the concept the defendant
was trying to communicate. 78 Moreover, the Court warned against
assuming that "one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. " 79
It is possible, however, to distinguish the prohibition of certain
words in Pacifica from their permissibility in a situation similar
to Cohen. In Pacifica, according to the Court, the "indecent"
words were not a part of any exposition of ideas. 80 When the same
point of view, but to the way in which it is expressed." The Court also stated: "A requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather
than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot
be expressed by the use of less offensive language." Id. at 743 n.18.
77 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
71
Id. at 26. The Court stated that
much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not
only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their
emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or
no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the
more important element of the overall message to be communicated.
As Professor Haiman notes, "it can hardly be maintained that. phrases like 'Repeal the
Draft,' 'Resist the Draft,' or 'The Draft Must Go' convey essentially the same message as
'Fuck the Draft.' Clearly something has been lost in the translation."
Haiman, supra note 41, at 189.
See also Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam opinion upholding
the right of a student to print the word "motherfucker" in a school newspaper); Keefe v.
Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969) (high school cannot prohibit teacher's use of the
word "motherfucker" in an educational context).
" 403 U.S. at 26.
80
438 U.S. at 746. It is possible to dispute the Court's finding that the use of the
"patently offensive" references to sexual or excretory functions and organs is not in itself
political. In a footnote to the opinion, the Court analogized the use of indecency in
discussing societal attitudes toward language to the use of obscene material in discussing
societal attitudes toward obscenity. This analogy is unpersuasive, however, since obscenity, as a legal term, lacks serious political value; obscene or pornographic printed material,
on the other hand, may be protected under some circumstances. Yet the Court in Pacifica
summarily dismissed the possibility that the broadcast of Carlin's monologue had any
political or social value, despite the fact that it was part of a larger discussion of society's
treatment of profanity. Id. at 746.
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words are used in the context of a discussion of public issues, as
in Cohen, they are protected as a part of that discussion. 81 An
alternative explanation is that the Court in Pacifica deliberately
ignored the Cohen decision. This interpretation accounts for the
Court's questionable determination that Carlin's use of indecent
words was not part of his message. Pacifica may also indicate that
the Court is retreating from Cohen.
The third aspect of the content offensiveness is the use of indecency in conjunction with, but not as an inherent part of, a political message. This type of speech has some political value because
a candidate's choice of words and campaign techniques may be
relevant factors in the voters' determination of the candidate's
fitness for office. As for the relationship of the indecent speech to
the message conveyed, however, the speech is much less a part
of the "exposition of ideas" than is the indecent speech discussed
above. The use of indecent speech for shock value bears little
relation to protected political speech. As such, it is more liable
to be regulated and weighs less heavily on the side of free speech.
First Amendment principles, however, seem to require that any
doubt as to the political nature of speech be resolved in favor of
its permissibility.
Finally, protection only extends to speech made in the context
of the campaign. One's status as a candidate for public office does
not confer on the candidate a right to be free from the general
restraints imposed on the public. The protection extends only to
his or her candidacy, not to the candidate personally. A campaign
cannot, for example, legitimize the distribution of obscene material by a candidate who happens to be seeking office.
II.

FIRST AMENDMENT STATUS OF THE BROADCAST MEDIA

If indecency is not coextensive with obscenity, 82 the question of

the constitutionality of broadcast media regulation of "indecent"
speech arises. Because the First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, " 83 any regulation of the media, except for
obscenity, 84 libel of private persons, 85 "fighting words, " 88 viola" "[I]ndecency is largely a function of context-it cannot be judged in the abstract."
Id. at 742. As the FCC later noted, "[t]he Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation . . . affords this Commission no general prerogative to intervene in any case
where words similar or identical to those in Pacifica are broadcast . . . . " WGBH Educ.
Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 (1978) .
., See notes 155-63 and accompanying text infra.
13
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
84 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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tions of national security, 87 and certain advocacy of unlawful acts
or violence 88 appears to be unconstitutional. It is well established,
however, that broadcasting, although within the scope of the First
Amendment, is subject to regulation which may include a
broader degree of content control than other speech. 89 The Supreme Court has ruled, for example, that Congress may impose
a right of reply requirement for persons or viewpoints attacked on
television or radio, 90 but that a similar state requirement imposed
on newspapers violated freedom of the press. 91
This limitation on the protection of the broadcast media does
not sanction unlimited regulation. Any interference must be justified to the extent that it interposes legitimate state interests in
place of First Amendment values. 92 It is therefore necessary to
examine the reasons why "broadcasting . . . has received the
most limited First Amendment protection" 93 and to determine if
those reasons justify regulating indecency in political broadcasts.
These reasons, which will be considered separately, are the limited number of broadcast frequencies and the pervasive nature of
the broadcast media.

A.

The Scarcity Doctrine

The primary justification offered for the different treatment of
broadcast media is the limited number of stations physically able
to broadcast within a given area. 94 The scarcity doctrine justifies
" Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
88 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
87
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
88
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919).
81
See, e.g., Pacifica; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Mt.
Mansfield Tel., Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971); Report and Statement of Policy
Res: Commission en bane Programing Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960).
'° Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
11 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
" See generally Pacifica; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969);
WGBH Educ. Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250 (1978).
" Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
" Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969): "Where there are
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable
to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." This doctrine originally
appeared in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-227 (1943). See
also Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
Many commentators have also noted its acceptance as a major justification for regulation.
See Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213
(1975); Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial
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Congress' decision to award licenses to stations operating in the
public interest. 95 The basic rationale is that the government had
to devise some method of allocating the limited number of available frequencies. While a number of systems were possible, such
as awarding licenses to the highest bidder or by lottery, Congress
elected to license those stations which best serve the public interest. The decision as to who would be the best licensee was vested
in the FCC, 98 which has the power to consider broadcasting content when determining whether the public interest is served.
There are, however, two reasons why the scarcity doctrine does
not justify the regulation of indecency in political broadcasting:
the lack of a logical nexus between scarcity and content regulation, and the vagueness of the public interest standard.
1. Scarcity as a justification for content control-The scarcity
doctrine has come under very strong criticism as a justification
for content control. First, it is questionable whether radio and
television frequencies actually are scarce resources. 97 With the
possible exception of a few major cities, there are no television
markets in which the spectrum of available frequencies is saturated. 98 It would be possible, from a purely technological standpoint, vastly to increase the number of stations in every market,
especially given the recent development of a broad cable
"spectrum."" Economic rather than technical limitations have
prevented the expansion of station ownership. 100 In distinguishing
between the print and broadcasting media, the problem of scarcity is misleading. There are only slightly fewer licensed television stations in the country than there are newspapers, and the
addition of cable television will probably equalize the numbers. 101
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1976); Kalven, Broadcasting, Public
Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAw & EcoN. 15 (1967); Powe, supra note 70.
15

47

u.s.c.

§ 307 (1976).

"Id.
" Bazelon, supra note 94, at 223. See also Note, Concepts of the Broadcast Media Under
the First Amendment: A Reevaluation and a Proposal, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 83 (1972).
" While some radio markets may be saturated, there is no scarcity of radio stations
when compared with print outlets. See text accompanying note 102 infra.
" Project, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 867, 983
(1972).
00
Powe, supra note 70, at 57.
••• Id. at 56. Professor Powe goes on to state that
if the concept of scarcity includes any consideration of intramedia competition,
then newspapers . . . become more likely candidates for regulation. Virtually all
cities have competition among at least three television stations and a dozen radio
signals. Yet in only one of every twenty-five cities is there a competing daily
newspaper available.
Id. at 57.
•
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The 1768 daily newspapers in the country are far exceeded_ by the
8034 licensed radio stations. 102 Thus, scarcity of resources speaks
no more forcefully for the regulation of broadcasting than it does
for the regulation of the print media.
Even if there is scarcity of available frequencies, it is not apparent that this situation justifies any content regulation. Despite
the Supreme Court decisions upholding content control, 183 there
is nothing inherent in the need for frequency allocation which
justifies interference with the content of a particular commercial
broadcast. 104 The general need to allocate does not justify such
thorough regulation of the broadcast media.
Professor Kalven offers a useful analogy for the allocation problem. The FCC's power to control access to broadcast frequencies
is like the power held by a town meeting chairperson who can ·
prevent two participants from speaking simultaneously but has
no right of control over what they say in their alloted times. 105
Content control of political commercials would not serve this allocation function. The town meeting chairperson's duty is to insure
that different points of view are considered. This function is best
served by allowing _all candidates to speak freely. The chairperson
exceeds his or her responsibility as much by interfering with the
way a speaker's views are presented as by controlling what is said.
The mistake in. using the scarcity doctrine as a rationale for
content regulation lies in the assumption that once regulation is
imposed, it can be expanded beyond its original purpose. Judge
Bazelon has noted that the key to the doctrine "is the limited
number of frequencies and not the mere existence of licensing." 106
It is not apparent how the method of expression of a particular
broadcast relates to the function of frequency allocation. 107 At the
extreme, it is conceivable that repeated use of indecency on the
air justifies awarding a license to a new owner at renewal time,
since licensing is related to allocation. It is wrong, however, to
associate the imposition of a fine, such as that in Pacifica, with
Id. at 56.
See cases cited in note 94 supra.
1°' See Bollinger, supra note 94; Kalven, supra note 94, at 37. It is interesting, as
Professor Kalven notes, that the broadcast media have generally accepted the regulation
of content. "First, the industry has under-estimated its legal position and given up too
soon. Second, on the assumption that its legal position is weak, it has neglected the
possibility of building policy, not legal arguments, upon the First Amendment." Kalven,
supra note 94, at 24 (emphasis in original).
105
Id. at 47-48.
"' Bazelon, supra note 94, at 223.
107 "[The argument) that technical scarcity necessitates licensing of broadcast facilities, does not compel the conclusion that program content may be regulated." Note, supra
note 42, at 1351. See also Kalven, supra note 94.
1• 2
103
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the need to allocate scarce resources. 108
2. The "public interest" as a justification for content control-In choosing criteria for allocation of frequencies, Congress
decided to grant licenses to those stations which best serve the
public interest. rn9 This standard is vague, since the statute does
not define the term "public interest." For example, the public has
a strong interest in knowing all it can about the candidates for
public office. Therefore, it is at least arguable that the public
interest is better served by allowing candidates to say whatever
they wish than by showing a censored version of the broadcast.
A candidate's decision to use "indecent" language is one factor
the voters may wish to take into account. If a voter finds a particular term grossly offensive, whether it is the word "nigger" or one
of the words proscribed in Pacifica, he or she may decide to vote
against a candidate for using it. In addition, the emotive force
behind some words is as important to the speech as the idea. To
prohibit Stoner from saying "nigger" would deny the voters of
Georgia the chance to judge the depth of his racism; to prevent
another candidate from using vulgarity would deny voters the
chance to judge the strength of the candidate's feelings. The public interest is best served when freedom from offensive speech
yields to the needs of the electoral system. Seen in this light, the
decision to meet the need for frequency allocation by regulating
in the public interest does not justify any control over the content
of political broadcasts. Thus, the scarcity doctrine is a weak justification for content control, particularly in a political context.

B.

Pervasive Nature

The second justification for controlling the broadcast media is
their "pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans." 110 There
are two aspects to this theory: the "captive" nature of the audience and the great influence of the broadcast media.
1. Captive audience-Under one prong of the pervasive na,.. As one author suggested in a discussion of the Court of Appeals' decision in Pacifica,
"[t]hat governmental evaluation of program content might be necessary in this limited
context [specific licensing decisions] . . . by no means supports proscription of specific
words or a specific broadcast." Comment, Pacifica Foundation v. FCC: "Filthy Words,"
the First Amendment, and the Broadcast Media, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 164, 177 (1978).
109
47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1976) provides: "The Commission, if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby . . . shall grant to any applicant therefor a station
license provided for by this chapter."
11 • Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748; Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). See also Bazelon, supra note 94, at 221 ("It is simply
impossible to exaggerate the impact of TV in particular on our lives and the lives of our
children.").
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ture approach, regulation is permitted because of the "passive"
nature of the audience's reception of the message. A commercial,
for instance, is thrust upon the viewer of an entertainment program. The commercial is, to a degree, an involuntary exposure to
material which may be indecent.
The right to privacy may in some circumstances justify governmental intrusion into broadcast content. Courts have applied it
to protect the viewer or listener from language deemed
"indecent" under 18 U.S.C. § 1464.1 11 In such a situation, the
First Amendment is balanced against the right of the viewer to
be free from the intrusion of unwanted messages. 112 The Supreme
Court has noted that "the right of every person 'to be let alone'
must be placed on the scales with the right of others to communicate . . . . [N]othing in the Constitution compels us to listen to
or view any unwanted communication, whatever its
merit . . . . " 113 This right, however, has limited applicability to
the broadcast media. While the right "to be let alone" has been
applied to justify content regulation, 114 television and radio constitute a voluntary exposure to possibly unwanted messages. The
audience is aware of the potential offensiveness of commercials
or regular programming, whether the offensiveness is sexual, racist, violent, or sexually stereotyped. By watching television, the
viewers voluntarily expose themselves to the possibility of being
offended. The Supreme Court has noted that even by stepping
out into public people risk being offended, 115 but the sudden confrontation with indecency can be ended immediately. Thus, the
burden is on the viewer "'to avoid bombardment of [his] sensibilities by simply averting [his] eyes' " 116 because turning on a
television or radio is as voluntary an act as walking outside.
In recognizing a right to be free from unwanted mailings, the
Court analogized to the right of a television viewer or radio listener to "twist the dial to cut off an offensive or boring communication and thus bar its entering his home." 117 Unlike unsolicited
mail, television is not an unwanted intruder into the home. NevSee notes 155-63 and accompanying text infra.
See, e.g., Haiman, supra note 41.
"' Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970) (upholding
39 U.S.C. § 4009, which allows people to prevent futher receipt of unsolicited, sexuallyoffensive mailings); cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (people assume the risk of
being offended in their daily dealings in society).
11
' See note 110 supra.
115 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971).
11 • Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (nudity at drive-in
theater), quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
117 Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
111

112
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ertheless, the Supreme Court in Pacifica held that this privacy
interest justified the Congressional ban on indecency over the
airwaves. The suggestion by Justice Brennan in dissent that the
offended listener could simply turn off his or her radio was re. jected. 118 The Court cited Rowan v. United States Post Office
Department 119 in applying the privacy interest, 120 yet ignored its
specific direction that the proper remedy is to shut off the television or radio. 121 If this option is insufficient to deal with the offense thrust upon the audience, the stations could be required to
issue warnings before the broadcast. 122
The Pacifica holding relied heavily on the Court's finding a
lack of political or social value in the broadcast. 123 Political broadcasts, however, since they are intended to influence the outcome
of elections, have the requisite political value to remove them
from the sphere of broadcasting which may be regulated. It is in
these circumstances that the First Amendment's prohibition
should be fully applied. m
2. Influence of broadcasting-The second prong of the pervasive nature approach is the power of the broadcasting media to
influence the audience. 125 The mere fact that a medium influences
438 U.S. at 765-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'" 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
,,. Id. at 748.
121 See note 117 and accompanying text supra. "[N]o one is ever legally required to
listen or watch, and the captive audience rationale only has meaning within a context in
which the listener is without choice." Powe, supra note 70, at 65.
122
Note, supra note 42, at 1365. For example, the stations broadcasting "Scared
Straight," a documentary about a program involving convicts and juvenile offenders,
warned the audience about the use of "street language" which was essential to the broadcast. The number of people tuning in after the warning but during a commercial would
probably be too small to warrant consideration; in a longer broadcast, the warning could
be repeated.
123
438 U.S. at 745-46. The decision in Pacifica is questionable for this reason. Carlin's
routine itself clearly has a political or social value, since it is a discussion of society',,
treatment of certain words. The particular broadcast by WBAI was part of a program
about society's attitude toward language. The Court attempted to separate the idea from
the mode of its expression. To find the words offensive, however, required a rejection of
Carlin's viewpoint. Carlin described the seven )VOrds as "the words you couldn't say on
the public airwaves"; apparently he was at least partially correct.
It is interesting to note that the FCC intends "strictly to observe the narrowness of the
Pacifica holding." WGBH Educ. Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 (1978).
"' Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971); Baldwin v. Redwood City,
540 F.2d 1360, 1366 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977). See also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966). See notes 12829 and accompanying text infra.
123
Bazelon, supra note 94, at 220-24; Note, supra note 99, at 995: "Television is perhaps
the most powerful and persuasive medium for, by its nature, it engenders a high degree
of participation from its audience. In addition, television can assemble an enormous
audience for its presentations, particularly during prime time." See generally M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1964).
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people does not, however, justify its regulation. As Judge Bazelon
stated, it is wrong "to suggest that the force of a particular mode
of speech in and of itself permits a generalized regulation of
speech." 128 Freedom of the press would be a useless principle if the
press were unable to exert any influence on the public. 127
The power of television and radio to influence the audience
actually is a reason to prohibit regulation, especially when considering political broadcasts. It is undeniable that broadcasting
has a tremendous impact on political campaigns and elections. 128
Any interference with political broadcasting therefore constitutes
interference with an important element of the electoral process.
If the electoral process is a highly protected First Amendment
interest and broadcasting is essential to modern political campaigns, 129 it follows that political broadcasting should be among
the most protected interests. Thus, the free speech interest
should weigh heavily against the interest in freedom from offensive speech. When these interests are balanced, it appears that
the constitutional dangers involved in restraining political broadcasts are not justified by the right to be free from occasional
unexpected indecent words. Indecent words, even if used for their
shock value, should not be regulated since they play a genuine,
though perhaps minor, role in political discussions.
Bazelon, supra note 94, at 222.
"The power to influence is a power which has always been exercised by all forms of
news media . . . . This fact standing alone does not call for different regulation of television, any more than newspapers should have been regulated when they were the dominant
source of news." Note, supra note 99, at 941.
111
See J. BROWN & P. STEIB, THE ART OF POLITICS (1976); R. MACNEIL, THE PEOPLE
MACHINE: THE INFLUENCE OF TELEVISION ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1968); J. MCGUINESS, THE
SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1968 (1968); G. POMPER, VOTERS' CHOICE 34 (1975); W. ROPER,
WINNING POLITICS 110 (1978); T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF A PRESIDENT-1968 196-97 (1969);
T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF A PRESIDENT-1960 279-95 (1961); Alexander, Communications
and Politics: The Media and the Message, in THE NEW STYLE IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 368
(R. Agranoff ed. 1972) ("[T]he most influential tool of the new communications has
been television."); National Journal, Politicking on Television, in THE NEW STYLE IN
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 280 (R. Agranoff ed. 1972) ("Political power is measured in terms of
access to TV.") (quoting N. JOHNSON, How TO TALK BACK TO YouR TELEVISION SET 1970));
Note, supra note 99, at 936. But see Powe, supra note 70, at 58-59, in which the author
questions the impact of television on the formation of political views. But Professor Powe
goes on to state that television tends to reinforce established views: "[the) potential
power of television probably derives more from the power to persuade further the already
persuaded than from the power to influence the uncommitted." Id. at 59. This effect is
an important measure of television's influence, however, since further persuasion may
motivate the already persuaded to register their views on Election Day.
121
Kaufman, The Medium, the Message, and the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV.
761, 773 (1970) ("In a large metropolitan area, a candidate without television time is not
a candidate at all."); National Journal, supra note 128, at 279; Note, supra note 42, at
1351 ("Political elections are won and lost on television; a 'media blackout,' or even poor
coverage, makes election to important offices virtually impossible for the victim.").
1
"
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C. Presence of Children in the Audience
Another justification given for differing treatment of the broadcast media is that "broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read." 130 This rationale is unique
to Pacifica. The dissenting opinion noted that it expanded a doctrine previously confined to cases of obscenity. With the exception of erotic materials appealing to the prurient interests of minors, the government had previously left judgments of propriety
to parents and had not attempted to determine what children
should see or hear. 131
In addition to making decisions which have formerly been left
to parental discretion, this extension differs significantly from the
use of less stringent obscenity standards for minors. In establishing the different standards, the Court in Ginsberg u. New York
upheld a state prohibition against the sale of pornography to
ininors, 132 but in no way interfered with the right of adults to
purchase such materials. 133 Thus, the state did not "reduce the
adult population . . . to reading only what is fit for children." 134
In broadcast regulation, however, the government achieves this
very result. Under Pacifica adults can see or hear only that which
the government deems appropriate for minors, at least at certain
times of the day.
The interest in preventing exposure of children to indecency is
a valid concern; even the most diligent parent may find it difficult to "screen" all of the material available to his or her children.
Instead of totally eliminating offensive matter in a broadcast,
however, warnings could be issued for programs which are not
"suitable" for children. As in Pacifica, the time of day is a factor
in political broadcasts, 135 but a candidate is unlikely to target his
or her advertising to time slots filled by children's programming.
There is little likelihood, for example, that the offending commercial would be broadcast during Saturday morning cartoon programs. Therefore, the protection of children from this "evil,"
which has never been proven harmful, 131 should not be allowed to
interfere with freedom of political speech.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
Id. at 767-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 42, at 1366; Comment, supra
note 108, at 182.
1• 2 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
133 Id. at 634-35.
131 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
130 The Court held that the time of day (two o'clock in the afternoon in Pacifica) is one
relevant factor in the "host of variables" to be considered. 438 U.S. at 750.
131 See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
130
131
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Partial Regulation Theory

An interesting approach to the broadcast/print media distinction has been suggested by Professor Bollinger. 137 He points out
that there are no valid differences between the two forms of communication justifying differing constitutional treatment, but that
Americans have almost universally accepted regulation of television and radio. 138 There are two incompatible yet desirable interests competing in determining the proper extent of media regulation. On the one hand, enforcing a degree of open access to the
media supports the goals of the First Amendment by preventing
monopolization of communications channels, a possibility which
is as dangerous as government censorship. Open access regulation, on the other hand, is by definition a restraint on the press.
Professor Bollinger notes three adverse effects of access regulation:139
1. The necessity of providing reply time would have a
"chilling effect" on the licensees' motivation to cover and discuss
political matters.
2. The administrative mechanism may be abused in order to
manipulate the opinions espoused by the media.
3. Once regulation is permitted for a legitimate, limited purpose, it may tend to escalate into broader regulation. This is
known as the "camel's-nose-in-the-tent" phenomenon. These
factors threaten the policy that "debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 140
The proper approach to the difference in treatment, according
to Bollinger, is to realize that different standards exist precisely
because there is no rational distinction between the two media
forms. Instead of balancing the two competing interests or adopting one to the exclusion of the other, each interest is assigned to
a single media form. The commitment to open access is represented by the system of broadcast frequency allocation and the
right of reply guarantees (the Equal Time provision and the Fairness Doctrine 141 ) imposed on the broadcasting media. 142 The beneBollinger, supra note 94.
Id. at 17. Professor Bollinger suggests that this public acceptance may be based on
the history of judicial rejection of the First Amendment's applicability to broadcasting,
the entertainment orientation of the broadcast media, uncertainty as to the technical
nature, capabilities, and dangers of broadcasting, and an exaggerated reaction to the need
for frequency allocation. Id. at 18-20. See also Kalven, supra note 94, at 16.
111 Bollinger, supra note 94, at 29-31.
''° New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See Part IB supra.
'" 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976).
141 Bollinger, supra note 94, at 27-29.
117

113

94

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 13:1

fits of non-regulation, on the other hand, are preserved by the
stricter ban on governmental interference with the print media.
Analyzing the issue in terms of the two media forms
"facilitate[s] realization of the benefits of two distinct constitutional values, both of which ought to be fostered. " 143
We now ask how this scheme of partial regulation,
"unknowingly" adopted by the Court, 144 would affect the analysis
of indecency in political broadcasting. It is useful to apply an
analysis similar to Professor Bollinger's by substituting the audience's privacy interest for the access factor as the interest opposing non-regulation. Regulation may be justifiable in the broadcast media in order to protect the privacy interest in being free
from unwanted, offensive communications. 145 The opposing interest in unregulated political speech would still find a home in the
print media. As Professor Bollinger contends, an exclusionary
balancing test would be unnecessary since each interest would be
protected.
While this resolution may be theoretically satisfactory, it is
unworkable in a practical political situation. Bollinger's approach
requires that the two media forms be equal. Any inequality between them would make balancing necessary, so that the more
valuable interest would be allocated to the more effective media
form. In the political context, however, the broadcast media have
a much stronger impact and a much broader audience than their
non broadcast counterparts. 148 The approach suggested by Professor Bollinger would deny the use of the preferable campaign
media to the "preferred" interest of political speech. This policy
would not, therefore, yield a fair allocation of resources.
The alternative application of the Bollinger approach, regulating the print media instead of the broadcast media, is equally
unattractive. It would not satisfy those asserting the privacy interest because the print media do not present the sudden, unavoidable messages delivered by television or radio. Furthermore,
regulation of the print media is blatantly repulsive to our constitutional history. 147
"' Id. at 36.
,.. Id. at 27. Professor Bollinger contends that the Court reached the correct result
(partial regulation) for the wrong reason (supposed differences between the media forms).
'" See Part 11B supra.
"' See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 129, at 773: "Some media are particularly effective
for the expression of certain specific messages, and the prohibition of those media would
greatly impair the ability of speakers effectively to advocate those causes." See also
Bazelon, supra note 94; Powe, supra note 70, at 45;· Note, supra note 99, at 936 (60% of
adult Americans rely on television for news); Note, supra note 42.
"' Regulation of broadcasting may be more palatable than regulation of print because
broadcasting, as a relatively new method of communication, has not had the long free
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The normal justifications for regulation of broadcast political
speech which the Court has adopted for prohibitions imposed on
the broadcast media must be balanced against the ultimate First
Amendment goal of free political speech. When these interests are
compared, the need for a fully-informed electorate should outweigh the right to be free from unwanted communications from
an invited source and the other justifications for differing treatment. Therefore, the constitutional standard of free speech
should apply even to the broadcast media. One commentator has
stated that "[t)he search for an intellectual rationale to support
broadcast regulation is in reality a post hoc attempt to explain
the status quo. " 148 The mere existence of regulation cannot serve
as a justification for overriding an integral constitutional value.
It is unwise to allow regulation which eliminates only the indecent aspect of the communication, since this constitutes interference with free political speech. The First Amendment guarantee
protects the way in which ideas are expressed as well as the content of those ideas. In all but a few circumstances, indecency
serves an important function in the candidate's message. It may
add emotive impact to what is being said, as in Cohen; it might
show the depth of a candidate's feelings, as in Stoner's campaign;
or it may merely reflect an aspect of the candidate's personality
which the voters may wish to consider. In all of these circumstances it serves a role in the electoral process which deE;erves
protection.

III.

STATUTORY ISSUES

If it is assumed that some regulation of political broadcasting
is constitutional, it is necessary to determine whether the existing
statutes permit such regulation. A variety of conflicting statutes
are presently in effect. 149 These include a ban on indecent Ianspeech history associated with newspapers. As Professor Kalven notes, "we all take as
commonplace a degree of government surveillance for broadcasting which would by instant reflex ignite the fiercest protest were it found in other areas of communication."
Kalven, supra note 94, at 16.
'" Powe, supra note 70, at 62. See also Bollinger, supra note 94, at 17-20; Kalven, supra
note 94, at 16; Note, supra note 99, at 984.
"' Most of the relevant ones are from the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064,
codified in Title 47 of the United States Code. For a comprehensive discussion of the
current FCC regulations and statutes governing political broadcasting, see National Association of Broadcasters, The Political Catechism (8th ed. 1976).
A bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Van Deerlin
to revise the Communications Act for the first time since 1934. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979). This bill would eliminate the public interest standard of regulation. Two
bills to amend the 1934 act have been introduced in the Senate. One, by Senator Hollings,
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guage, 150 a prohibition of censorship by the FCC, 151 and a section
on the responsibility of stations towards political candidates. 152
When all of the statutory factors are considered, however, neither
the FCC nor individual stations have power to control the content
of political commercials. Moreover, stations are not liable for that
content. 153 The status of non-commercial political broadcasts is
less certain, but the relevant regulatory power is weak. 15'

A.

Prohibition of Indecency

Section 1464 of the Federal Criminal Code makes it unlawful
to "utter any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
radio communication . . . . " 155 This article has assumed the existence of broadcast "indecency" in the foregoing discussion of
the constitutional issues. At this point it is appropriate to discuss
the term as used in the statute.
Despite decisions to the contrary, 158 it is now well established
that indecency is not coextensive with the constitutional standard for obscenity. 157 Unlike the obscenity standards, the standard for indecency in broadcasting does not require an appeal to
prurient interest. 158 The basic elements of indecency are its
"nonconformance with accepted standards of morality" 159 or offensiveness by contemporary community standards. 180
Except for the two FCC decisions ruling that Stoner's use of the
would not affect any of the provisions discussed in this section. S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979). The other bill, introduced by Senator Goldwater, would eliminate the public
interest standard for licensing radio stations, but not for television. S. 622, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 333(a) (1979).
"" 18 u.s.c. § 1464 (1976).
1• 1 47 u.s.c. § 326 (1976).
112 47 u.s.c. § 315 (1976).
153
See notes 180-81 and accompanying text infra.
1.. The prohibition of station content regulation in § 315(a) is limited to paid commercials.
153 18 u.s.c. § 1464 (1976).
1.. United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1977); Duncan v. United States, 48
F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 863 (1931).
1• 1 See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
1.. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739-41; Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515
F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972); Eastern
Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970). In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974),
the Supreme Court held that indecency is identical to obscenity in mailing cases under
18 U.S.C. § 1461. Pacifica distinguished the standards for broadcasting on the grounds
that broader standards can, under the Constitution, be adopted under § 1464 than under
§ 1461, since the mail is subject to full First Amendment protection, while broadcasting
is not. 438 U.S. at 740-41.
,., Id. at 740.
190 Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972).
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word "nigger" was not indecent, 181 all other reported section 1464
cases involved references to sexual subjects .. The Pacifica decision, in holding that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague, held that "[a]t most . . . the Commission's definition of
indecency will deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive
references to excretory and sexual organs and activities." 182
Therefore, situations such as the Stoner commercials would be
outside the realm of "indecent" speech, as currently defined by
the FCC, despite its offensiveness to many.
The problem thus becomes one of determining which words
dealing with sex or excretion are indecent. One important factor
is the context in which the particular offensive words were used,
a factor on which Pacifica relies heavily .183 The use of offensive
or excretory terms for their shock value at a time when children
would be expected to be in the audience could thus bring a political commercial within the prohibition of section 1464. 184

B.

FCC Enforcement Authority

If a political commercial contains indecency proscribed by section 1464, it is necessary to consider the authority of the FCC to
prevent or sanction its broadcast. Because section 326 of the
Communications Act of 1934 precludes the FCC from imposing
any censorship, 185 the FCC cannot prevent the broadcast of
"indecent" material. This section "unequivocally denies the
Commission any power to edit proposed broadcasts in advance
and to excise materials considered inappropriate for the airwaves. "188
Under the Act, however, the FCC may enforce its sanctions
"' Julian Bond, 69 F.C.C.2d 943 (1978); Atlanta NAACP, 36 F.C.C.2d 635 (1972).
112 438 U.S. at 743.
113 See note 81 supra.
"' See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50.
115 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976) provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission
the power of censorship over the radio communication or signals transmitted by
any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed
by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means
of radio communication.
This prohibition would not be affected by the proposed revisions of the Communications
Act discussed in note 149 supra. The House bill provides that "nothing in this Act shall
be construed to give the Commission the power to censor or otherwise regulate the content
of any transmission . . . " except for a few inapplicable exceptions. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 422 (1979).
'" Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735. The FCC has indicated that Pacifica did not grant it broad
authority to intervene before the broadcast of words identical to those used by Carlin.
WGBH Educ. Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 (1978); Julian Bond, 69 F.C.C.2d 943
(1978).
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against indecency. The Commission has three available remedies
for violations of section 1464: license revocation, 167 issuance of a
cease and desist order, 168 and fines of up to $1000. 169 This authority, despite its possible "chilling effect," is not inconsistent with
section 326. Thus, while the FCC may not censor "indecent"
broadcasts, it may punish them after the broadcasts. 170
The FCC's remedial sanctioning authority can only be exercised against the licensee station or sfations broadcasting the
indecent matter, not against the sponsoring candidate. The Supreme Court, however, has held that the stations are immune
from criminal prosecutions for defamation in political commercials due to the contradictory mandates of the law .171 Stations
should be equally immune from all FCC sanctions under section
1464.172

C.

Station Responsibility and Liability

The major question regarding indecency in political commercials involves section 1464 and other statutes governing political
broadcasts. Section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934
completely bars content control by the stations. 173 Once air time
is purchased, the station is powerless to control its use. 174 Al47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6) (1976).
47 U.S.C. § 312(b)(2) (1976).
"' 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(e) (1976).
170 "The prohibition [of§ 326) . . . has never been construed to deny the Commission
the power to review the content of completed broadcasts in the performance of its regulatory duties." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735; Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC,
403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
171 See notes 180-81 and accompanying text infra. Section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 states:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities
to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station:
Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast under the provisions of this subsection. No obligation is imposed under
this section to allow the use of its stations by any such candidate.
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976).
171
See notes 180-81 and accompanying text infra.
173
For the text of§ 315(a), see note 171 supra.
17 ' Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Farmers Educ. & Coop.
Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959); FCC Primer on Political Broadcasting and
Cablecasting, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,342 at 36,348 (1978). The Supreme Court in Farmers Union
defined the prohibited censorship as "any examination of thought or expression in order
to prevent publication of 'objectionable' material." 360 U.S. at 527 (emphasis in original).
The proposed revision of the Communications Act would continue the ban on station
censorship. "Such television broadcasting station licensee shall have no control over the
content or format of any material broadcast under the provisions of this section." H.R.
3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 463(a)(2) (1979). This new "equal opportunity" section,
however, would only apply to paid commercials, not to time donated by the station. The
117
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though section 315(a) is generally known as the Equal Time provision, the prohibition on censorship applies to "first
uses"-political statements not made in reply to previous broadcasts-as well as to time which is required to be sold or given
under this section.'75 Moreover, stations cannot reject commercials or cancel sales of air time due to the content of an advertisement.178
Thus, licensee stations are faced with a dilemma: one provision, section 315(a), prevents them from exercising any control
over the content of political commercials, while another provision, section 1464, makes them responsible for the broadcast of
any indecent material.
Since it imposes no obligation to accept any political advertising, section 315(a) seems to leave the option of refusing all political broadcasts. If this tactic were the only alternative, however,
in practice most political commercials would be eliminated. This
result is incompatible with the goal of an informed electorate. 177
In fact, despite the disclaimer in section 315(a) of any affirmative
obligation to accept political commercials, stations are now partially obligated to do so. The Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 amended the Communications Act of 1934 by adding a new
ground for denial of an application for license renewal, which is
"willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to
permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a
broadcast station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal
elective office on behalf of his candidacy." 178
The best solution to this dilemma is to hold the prohibitions
against indecency 179 inapplicable to political commercials. This
policy is justified by the canon of statutory construction preferproposed act also continues the right of stations to refuse use by any candidate. Id. §
463(b). Senator Goldwater's bill would impose a requirement to allow time for candidates
for federal office. S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 335(0(10) (1979).
'" Hammond for Governor Comm., 69 F.C.C.2d 946 (1978); Port Huron Broadcasting
Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948).
171 See Sage v. Station WHEN-TV, 62 F.C.C.2d 135 (1976); Port Huron Broadcasting
Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948).
177
Approaching a separate but related problem, the Supreme Court held that the Fairness Doctrine did not impose an obligation on stations to accept paid editorial advertisements. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
But see note 178 and accompanying text infra.
'" Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 103(a)(2)(A), 86 Stat. 3 (1971). In addition, § 315(a) was
changed so as not to conflict with the new requirement: "The second sentence of section
315(a) . . . is amended by inserting 'under this subsection' after 'No obligation is imposed.'" Id. § 103(a)(2)(B).
The proposed revision of the act should not affect this provision since the nonobligation construction is limited to "[t)he provisions of this section. . . .'' H.R. 3333,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 463(b) (1979).
171 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) and the ancillary provisions, 47 U.S.C. §§ 312 & 503 (1976).
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ring the more specific of two conflicting provisions. One provision
of the Communications Act of 1934 punishes indecency, thus giving stations an inherent right and responsibility to control the
content of what they broadcast, which extends to all broadcast
material, including entertainment and commercials. The noncensorship provision of section 315(a) is narrower, however, since
it only applies to content control of political commercials. Therefore, section 315(a) should take precedence, rendering section
1464 inapplicable.
The second justification for this interpretation is the Supreme
Court's grant of immunity from libel actions for broadcasts covered by section 315(a). 180 The rationale behind this immunity
applies as much to punishment of indecency as it does to defamation. The rationale is that "the section would sanction the unconscionable result of permitting civil and perhaps criminal liability to be imposed for the very conduct the statute demands of
the licensee." 181 It would be equally senseless to impose administrative or criminal sanctions on broadcasters caught in this web
after selling commercial time for political advertisements.
The situation is more difficult, however, in cases not involving
time purchased by or donated to the candidate for his or her
personal use, because section 315 is limited to these cases. 182 In
such circumstances, section 1464 applies fully. Stations are thus
liable for the broadcast of indecent language in a news forum or
in a commercial supporting a candidate which features someone
other than the candidate.
The broadcast of offensive language, including "profanity,"
would not, however, necessarily result in punishment of the licensee. The FCC must consider the circumstances under which the
broadcast was made and would be unlikely to punish a station for
broadcasing a candidate's remarks in an interview or speech. In
pre-recorded broadcasts, stations might be required to issue
warnings of the offensive nature of some of the comments. Commercials made by persons other than the candidate may indeed
be punished, even though the Commission has determined that
the station is serving the public interest by allowing the commercial to be aired so that the electorate is more aware of the nature
of the campaign and the candidate.
118 Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959); accord, Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Lamb v. Sutton, 274 F.2d 705 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830 (1960).
111 360 U.S. at 531.
,u Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
909 (1951).
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CONCLUSION

It is generally impermissible, under both the Constitution and
existing statutes, to censor or sanction broadcast political speech
because of its indecent content. Because of the substantial interest in protecting political speech, the generally-accepted notion
that the First Amendment does not fully protect the broadcast
media fails to justify regulation of political broadcasts. The traditional justifications for differing treatment of the broadcast and
print media do not outweigh the degree of protection afforded
political speech. Even if regulation were constitutionally permissible, the relevant existing statutes only permit regulation in very
narrow circumstances. Both the FCC and the stations are powerless to control content. The constitutional guarantees protecting
the free discussion of political issues should consequently remain
paramount.

-Jonathan Golomb

